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A Dominant Social Comparison 
Heuristic Unites Alternative 
Mechanisms for the Evolution of 
Indirect Reciprocity
Roger M. Whitaker1, Gualtiero B. Colombo1, Stuart M. Allen1 & Robin I. M. Dunbar2
Cooperation is a fundamental human trait but our understanding of how it functions remains 
incomplete. Indirect reciprocity is a particular case in point, where one-shot donations are made 
to unrelated beneficiaries without any guarantee of payback. Existing insights are largely from 
two independent perspectives: i) individual-level cognitive behaviour in decision making, and ii) 
identification of conditions that favour evolution of cooperation. We identify a fundamental connection 
between these two areas by examining social comparison as a means through which indirect reciprocity 
can evolve. Social comparison is well established as an inherent human disposition through which 
humans navigate the social world by self-referential evaluation of others. Donating to those that are at 
least as reputable as oneself emerges as a dominant heuristic, which represents aspirational homophily. 
This heuristic is found to be implicitly present in the current knowledge of conditions that favour 
indirect reciprocity. The effective social norms for updating reputation are also observed to support 
this heuristic. We hypothesise that the cognitive challenge associated with social comparison has 
contributed to cerebral expansion and the disproportionate human brain size, consistent with the social 
complexity hypothesis. The findings have relevance for the evolution of autonomous systems that are 
characterised by one-shot interactions.
Insights have long been sought as to how indirect reciprocity has evolved in the human population. Indirect rec-
iprocity can be modelled through prosocial donations which result in a cost c to the donor and a benefit b for a 
genetically unrelated recipient, where b > c > 0. Widely used1–6 to consider indirect reciprocity7,8, this model is a 
subclass of the mutual aid game9 where the donor incurs a cost with no guarantee of reciprocation from the ben-
eficiary, or any other individual. Such prosocial behaviour is widespread in human society10, influencing diverse 
phenomena such as morality11, culture12, economics and technology13.
Precisely why humans donate their resources to unrelated individuals has received considerable attention but 
remains only partially understood. Hamilton’s kin selection theory14,15 indicates how it is expected of kin, but this 
does not extend to unrelated strangers. Further contributions have addressed two perspectives. Firstly, from early 
contributions on sustaining cooperation15,16, research has sought to characterise the conditions through which 
evolution promotes indirect reciprocity1,4,9,17,18, extending to the coevolution of genes and social norms19–21. More 
recently, the focus has been on the cognitive characteristics of prosocial decision making22,23, addressing the 
extent to which prosocial behaviour is intuitive24 and mediated as a heuristic within a framework of dual cognitive 
processing25,26.
This recent examination of prosocial decision making is built on the dominance of intuitive processes27 that 
allow complexity to be handled with a low cognitive burden. These processes represent heuristics which are fast 
and automatic, triggered by cues, guided by emotion and association, and involve little conscious thought28. Such 
type-1 cognitive processes are distinguished from deliberate reasoning: in contrast the alternative (type-2) cogni-
tive processes are slower, reflective and present a greater cognitive challenge. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis22 
proposes that dual-processing governs intuitive prosociality: the behaviours that support success in regular social 
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interactions become intuitive and automatic, unless they are moderated by reflective type-2 processes that repre-
sent learning to update a type-1 heuristic.
Based on evidence22 that the dual processing framework may shape intuitive prosocial behaviour, an imme-
diate question concerns the nature of possible type-1 heuristics, and their general characteristics. In the absence 
of detailed context and extensive memory, perception relative to oneself provides an immediate and persistent 
frame of reference29. Stemming from the seminal contributions on social comparison by Festinger30, there is com-
prehensive evidence31–34 that self-referential evaluation influences decision making under conditions of bounded 
rationality, and from a social perspective, comparison enables generosity to be influenced by the actions of 
others35–37. Consequently, there is a basis to suggest that social comparison is a potential feature in type-1 heu-
ristics, as suggested in other contexts38,39. Social comparison is also phylogenetically ancient40 and embedded in 
human survival, with its suggested origins in evaluating competitors and assessing whether or not to commit 
resources to challenge a rival in the hierarchy. Continued re-assessment of others and deliberation over observed 
social positioning requires significant cognitive resources relative to other species7, consistent with the challenge 
of type-2 processing and the unusually large brain size in humans compared to other all other vertebrates41.
But what are the successful social comparison heuristics and how does social comparison feature in prosocial 
behavioural strategies? Simulation is a well established methodology to assess the evolution of cooperation16. In 
isolation of other factors, evolutionary simulation allows us to examine the social comparison heuristics favoured 
by natural selection, and the consequences of strategies that incorporate social comparison heuristics. We assess 
this in the context of indirect reciprocity and the donation game, where reputation acts as a universal currency42 
through which social credibility between non-kin can be displayed, assessed and acted upon7,8,43–46. Specifically, 
we consider the self-comparison of reputation as a basis for heuristic decision making concerning donation.
To model social comparison we may assume that a donor i assesses the reputation rj of a potential recipi-
ent j, against their own reputation, ri, with three possible outcomes, establishing either: approximate similar-
ity (rj − Δ ≤ ri ≤ rj + Δ ), upward self-comparison (rj > ri + Δ ), or downward self-comparison (rj < ri − Δ ). 
Reputation is assumed to be public and available to all agents. After assessing the potential recipient j, the dona-
tion decision that i makes in respect of j depends on their choice of social comparison heuristic. The social 
comparison heuristic for an individual i is represented as a triple of binary variables (si, ui, di) indicating whether 
or not i donates when similarity (si), upward comparison (ui) or downward comparison (di) is observed by i in 
respect of j’s reputation. For example, (1, 1, 0) indicates that i would donate to j exactly when i observes either 
approximate similarity or upward comparison of reputation in respect of j. Further, (0, 1, 1) indicates that i would 
donate to j precisely when the reputation of j is not approximately similar to that of i, and so on. Consequently 
there are 23 possible social comparison heuristics that an individual may adopt.
Despite the potentially significant role that social comparison plays in human behaviour, social comparison 
has rarely featured in the evolutionary analyses of indirect reciprocity. In evolutionary terms, social comparison 
heuristics represent action rules. These operate in tandem with assessment rules that are the criteria by which 
the donor’s reputation is updated in light of their actions, and a combination of action and assessment rules 
represents a strategy. Assessment rules represent social norms, which humans are well-disposed to internalising 
and perpetuating20,47,48 with the judgement over reward and penalty that they provide formulating a model for 
morality7. Assessment rules are also highly influential in evolution, with three main alternatives studied being 
image scoring, standing and judging, with additional variations on these49.
Early work exploring indirect reciprocity tended not to have strict delineation between action and assessment 
rules. Standing9 was such a breakthrough, which identified the conditions through which indirect reciprocity may 
evolve from pairwise application of the donor game, showing that “tit-for-tat” behaviour supporting the evolu-
tion of direct reciprocity50 can be generalised through standing. This assessment rule effectively classifies each 
individual in the population as either good or bad, penalising the good if they donate to the bad. Image scoring1,8 
was the first significant alternative, involving a simple assessment rule where reputation is incremented or dec-
remented in response to donation or defection. A limitation of image scoring is that discriminators who choose 
not to cooperate with defectors may be unfairly labelled as less cooperative3,17. Consequently, with their roots in 
the work of Sugden9, standing3 and judging51,52 have emerged as the natural alternatives that capture “legitimate 
shirking”18,47,53. These discrimination rules have mainly been studied assuming that reputation has a binary rep-
resentation4,52,54. However non-binary reputation permits a greater range in status from which the donor can 
make assessments of others.
To investigate social comparison in the presence of a non-binary reputation, we generalise standing and judging 
as defined for binary representation. We decrement reputation when defection occurs in light of a request 
from a player whose reputation is not lesser than that of the donor’s reputation, with the additional require-
ment for judging that reputation is decremented when cooperation occurs in light of a request from a less 
reputable player. Otherwise reputation is incremented when the donor cooperates and decremented when 
the donor defects.
We examine the evolution of social comparison heuristics in the presence of alternative assessment rules, and 
observe the self-comparison heuristics that are promoted by natural selection. We model a population of N agents 
from which random pairs are selected to play the donation game. Each generation involves playing m rounds of 
the donation game, and in each game a player pair i, j is randomly selected from the population. Player i chooses 
whether or not to donate to j based on its current social comparison heuristic. If i chooses to donate then the total 
payoffs for i and j are updated, with i incurring a cost c and j gaining a benefit b. After each game, the reputation 
for i is updated in light of their donation behaviour, in accordance with either image scoring, standing or judging. 
After completing m rounds of the donation game, the next generation is created through asexual reproduction. 
Social comparison heuristics are propagated to the next generation of agents based on uniform random selection 
weighted by their relative payoff, with mutation allowing for a random change of heuristic.
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Unless otherwise stated, our results assume a single homogeneous population, however we also investigate the 
effects of having a structured population, where agents only undertake interactions within sub-groups. Genetic 
consideration of such a heterogeneous population originates from a spatial perspective through the Island 
Model55. More recently in an online context, such self-focussed sub-groups have been found to cause significant 
disruptive effects56. Where indicated, we apply an idealised Island Model17 in which the population is sub-divided 
into g social groups. This model restricts players to in-group interactions and the reproductive influence of the 
global population is controlled as an experimental parameter. Further details are provided in the methods section.
Results
The similar and upward social comparison heuristic dominates. Initially we consider the effect of 
social comparison using the image scoring assessment rule, which is the least sophisticated approach that allows 
observation of evolution without any effects from discriminatory assessment. Keeping other variables constant, 
we vary the cost-benefit ratio c/b as shown in Fig. 1.
Low c/b ratios, such as 0.1, are typically required for indirect reciprocity to be sustained through image scoring 
models17, and when the cost-benefit ratio reaches 0.5, they are known to perform quite poorly. Figure 1 reflects 
this; however in the cost-benefit range where evolution is sustained (i.e., at most c/b = 0.25), the (1, 1, 0) heuristic, 
representing donation to those with similar or better reputation, clearly dominates. This indicates a potential cycle 
of donation that is driven by an escalating relative perception.
An individual i who frequently donates will experience an increase in their own reputation, which affects their 
perception of others relative to themselves. For example, after a reputational increase for i, a third party j who 
originally had a similar reputation to i is subsequently perceived by i as having lower standing. When i adopts the 
dominant strategy of donating to those with a similar or better reputation, then j must increase her own reputa-
tion (i.e., number of donations) in order to remain eligible to receive donations from i. We note that this dynamic 
operates within each generation, between selection and reproduction. Social comparison couples individual per-
ception of others to their own standing, and evolution acts on the heuristics governing relative perceptions, rather 
than on absolute thresholds for the perception of acceptable/unacceptable donation behaviour.
Figure 2 shows the results from Fig. 1 in terms of average payoff per player per generation, where the payoff 
to an individual adopting a given strategy is the difference between benefit and cost incurred over a generation. 
Figure 1. Evolution of social comparison heuristics with image scoring assessment while varying the 
cost-benefit ratio c/b. The plots represent the relative distribution of heuristics present in the population taken 
from all generations. The shaded areas are proportional to the frequency of the associated heuristic. Parameters 
settings are reported in the Methods Section.
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For lower cost-benefit ratios (e.g., 0.1, 0.25) that support the emergence of cooperation, the payoff per individual 
reflects the behaviour in Fig. 1 where the cooperative strategies produce the highest payoff, and in particular the 
dominant approach of donating to those with similar or higher reputation. When the cost-benefit ratio reaches 
0.5 this trend is reversed. The dominant (1, 1, 0) heuristic still produces the highest payoff per individual but with 
marginal average payoff as compared to lower c/b ratios. Beyond this c/b ratio (i.e., c/b = 0.75), defection becomes 
rational (Fig. 1c) but yields little positive payoff on average. Here the vast majority of generations are characterised 
by near zero donations being made.
Discriminatory assessment rules reinforce the dominant strategy. The evolution of indirect reci-
procity under image scoring is known to be susceptible to non-discriminatory assessment rules3,57 and therefore 
it is valuable to consider the effects of standing and judging2,54 to update reputation (Fig. 3). When generalised to 
a non-binary representation of reputation and considered in the context of social comparison, standing involves 
decrementing the reputation of i when i defects in light of a request from a player j with at least the reputation of i. 
Judging offers greater penalisation than standing by punishing a donor for not further targeting their behaviour, 
with the reputation of ri decremented when i makes a donation to a less reputable recipient j.
We observe that the discrimination provided by standing and judging exactly represents penalties for actions 
which are inconsistent with the dominant social comparison rule of donation to a recipient of similar or upward 
standing. Consequently the social norms provided by standing and judging embody social comparison and 
this mechanism further supports the evolution of indirect reciprocity, as seen in Fig. 3. In particular standing 
and judging increase the extent of cooperative behaviour in the population, reaching in excess of 90% for low 
cost-benefit ratios (e.g., 0.1). The selective effects of discrimination from standing and judging, as compared to 
image scoring, also significantly extend the range of cost benefit ratio at which cooperation is sustained, for exam-
ple with both standing and judging reaching nearly 90% cooperation levels with cost-benefit ratios of 0.85. Thus 
when the cost is relatively high, discrimination becomes influential.
Social comparison provides robustness against errors. We investigate the sensitivity of the social 
comparison model to errors in both user perception and execution. Perception errors involve inaccuracy in the 
perceived reputation, modelled by misreading the potential recipient’s reputation with probability pr, in which 
case an alternative reputation is uniformly selected from another member of the population. This type of error 
Figure 2. Average payoff per player per generation for the alternative social comparison strategies, using 
image scoring assessment while varying the cost-benefit ratio c/b. Parameter settings are consistent with 
those in Fig. 1.
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has been a focus for attention in previous studies2, aligned to the effects of gossip and malicious misreporting5. 
Perception error is known to cause negative effects on discriminatory assessments such as standing58, but exhib-
iting robustness when error rates are relatively small17.
Results (Fig. 4) are consistent with previously published work applying perception error17. When applying 
standing and judging for social comparison, evolution is resilient to reasonable error rates such as 5% with similar 
degradation in the frequency of cooperative interaction evident when the experiment is repeated at a higher error 
rate (e.g., pr = 10%). Image scoring exhibits similar behaviour under perception error but shows a large degrada-
tion in the population’s cooperative behaviour as error level increases.
In contrast to perception error, execution errors represent involuntary human mistakes, which have received 
less attention3,59. This error represents a failure to execute the intended strategy and has two forms: one-way 
execution error is applied with probability e to any donation action; two-way execution error is applied with 
probability e to both donation and defection decisions. Consistent with the published literature17, results from 
our experiments show that strategies based on social comparison are robust to modest errors of both types (e.g., 
e = 5%). However, the impact of execution errors on the frequency of donation is generally worse than perception 
errors, increasing with the error rate. Additionally, the discriminating strategies of standing and judging show 
almost identical characteristics for both one-way and two-way errors. With perception errors there is a chance 
that reputation will still be appropriately classified by social comparison, however failure to execute an intended 
action offers no direct opportunity for evolutionary recovery through rebalancing effects, that is errors leading to 
increased defection being offset by errors leading to increased cooperation.
For non-discriminating assessment provided by image scoring, the results from the two-way execution error 
not only exhibits superior cooperation levels as compared to one-way execution error, but the results are compa-
rable to those of standing and judging in terms of the decrease in average cooperation as compared to a zero error 
state. This is consistent with the observation that two-way execution error may self-compensate through the equal 
treatment of error in defection and donation3,59 which is more likely to occur when reputation is updated without 
discrimination, as in image scoring.
Figure 3. Cooperation from the social comparison strategies using different assessment rules while 
varying the cost-benefit ratio c/b. Parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1. “Average cooperation” indicates 
the frequency of cooperative interaction: the number of donations made as a proportion of the total number of 
games played in all preceding generations.
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The dominant social comparison heuristic provides evolutionary stability. We assess the dominant 
similar and upward comparison heuristic for evolutionary stability. As with all other strategies, strategies involv-
ing social comparison cannot discriminate against duplicitous agents who initially cooperate to encourage the 
evolution of a prosocial population, with a view to subsequently exploiting the population by free-riding60. 
However, it is prudent to examine the extent to which discrimination present in the similar and upward com-
parison heuristic is sufficient to dominate over defectors, including performance in extreme scenarios. This is 
shown in Fig. 5, where a sub-population adopting the similar and upward comparison heuristic is examined in 
the presence of defectors. The sub-population adopts this heuristic with assessment through either image scoring, 
standing or judging. The probability of convergence to zero defectors represents the proportion of cases from 
1000 runs.
Overall, a high proportion of defectors are needed to prevent the evolution of a sub-population that adopts 
the dominant (1, 1, 0) heuristic. If just 10% of the population apply the similar and upward comparison heuristic 
while discriminating through standing or judging, then the chance of fully eradicating defectors is 98.7% for 
standing and 99.2% for judging. Consistent with previous observations made on the lesser evolutionary stability 
of image scoring3, a much larger sub-population is required (over 40%) to achieve similar levels of performance 
when image scoring is applied as the assessment rule. These results suggest considerable resilience, particularly 
when the social norm in standing and judging further reinforces behaviour consistent with similar and upward 
comparison.
Convergence to zero defectors is relatively rapid even when the initial sub-population adopting the similar and 
upward comparison heuristic is small. For example, on average, when adopting standing within a sub-population 
representing 5%, the population converges to zero-defectors within 10.55 generations (SD = 3.45), where each 
player acts as a potential donor on average 50 times per generation. Under the same conditions judging converges 
marginally quicker (mean = 10.3, SD = 3.37) and image scoring never converges to a population with zero defec-
tors. With a sub-population of 40 adopting the similar and upward comparison heuristic, there is a greater chance 
that the population will converge to zero defectors. This occurs more slowly for image scoring (mean = 7.63, 
SD = 2.24) as compared to standing (mean = 3.61, SD = 0.69) and judging (mean = 3.52, SD = 0.69).
A hetrogeneous population structure can enhance the global cooperation level. We assume a 
heterogeneous population structure by sub-dividing the population into isolated social groups consistent with the 
Figure 4. Effect of perception and execution error on the social comparison strategies. c/b ratio = 0.25. 
Parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1. The error rate applied is 5%.
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idealised Island Model17. The social groups define the boundaries within which members may donate to others. 
The global population (N = 100) is structured into g social groups of equal size for g = 2, 3, 4, 5 (when g = 3 the 
groups are of size 33 and 34). We adopt assessment by image scoring and standing with c/b ratios selected as 0.1 
and 0.85 respectively, and execution and perception error rates of 2.5% are applied. These conditions allow the 
observation of a heterogeneous population when p, the probability of reproduction from the local sub-population 
rather than the global population, is varied.
Under these parameters the results show that a social group structure can positively affect the evolution of 
cooperation. This is particularly evident for the less sophisticated image scoring assessment, as compared to 
standing, where potential increases in cooperation are at best marginal. Figure 6 shows that for image scoring 
cooperation increases with both the number of social groups and the probability of reproduction within groups p. 
However, when reproduction is entirely limited to the local population (p = 1), total cooperation levels drop sig-
nificantly, with smaller groups increasing this effect for both image scoring and standing.
Contributory to this phenomenon is the small number of possible strategies that social comparison affords, 
with just eight possible states as compared to 121 for the original image scoring model1. This encourages domi-
nant strategies to readily evolve in small sub-groups, although such dominant strategies may be non-cooperative 
due to the lower chance of in-group diversity and the effects of genetic drift. However when a small chance of 
reproduction from the global population is introduced (e.g., p = 0.95), this provides an opportunity to introduce, 
with high payoff, cooperative strategies into any non-cooperative sub-groups. As found in the previous section 
of results, only a small number of players with number of the (1, 1, 0) strategy are required to dominate over a 
defecting population, allowing non-cooperative sub-groups to be dominated. The results in Fig. 6 also reaffirm 
the correlation between the dominant (1, 1, 0) social comparison heuristic and high cooperation levels.
Discussion
The results demonstrate that heuristics based on social comparison support the evolution of indirect reciprocity, 
naturally implying eight possible heuristic alternatives. Critically, each heuristic is based on relative evaluation to 
oneself, in alignment with evidence of a human psychological disposition. This means that an individual’s reputa-
tion may also affect their perception of others, in contrast to reputation systems that are often solely focussed on 
how they may be perceived by others.
The results show that a dominant social comparison heuristic is readily identifiable, namely donating to those 
that are at least as reputable as oneself. This is a form of aspirational homophily, since it represents association, 
through donation, with those of similar or preferential reputational status. Adopting a strategy incorporating 
this heuristic supports a phenomenon where to remain eligible for donations from reputable peers, recipients 
must also maintain their own reputation. Because social comparison heuristics assume that perceptions are made 
relative to oneself, this dynamic functions within each generation of evolution, meaning that an individual’s eli-
gibility to receive or make a donation may change even though their strategy could remain fixed. Through these 
comparative interactions, an individual’s donation behaviour and prospects to receive a donation are influenced 
by others, being dependent on the reputation of the wider population.
We note that a number of experiments concerning human behaviour provide indirect empirical insights on 
the dynamics that we observe through simulation. Cooperation in the form of generosity has been observed to 
be contagious61, with receipt of donations positively influencing their subsequent generosity. Observational evi-
dence62 suggests that the image score of the recipient influences the helping decision, with a reasonable number of 
participants identified as making this decision relative to their own image score. Homophilic donation behaviour 
Figure 5. The ability of a discriminating sub-population adopting the (1, 1, 0) heuristic, to dominate in 
the presence of defectors. Population size N is fixed at 100. c/b ratio = 0.25. μ = 0. Other parameter settings 
are consistent with Fig. 1. Error rates in both execution and perception are applied at 5%. The probability of 
convergence to zero defectors represents the proportion of cases from 1000 runs in which the behaviour is 
observed.
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has been observed63 where high donors achieve a higher than average expected payoff by cooperating mainly 
with other highly cooperative donors. Similar findings are also present in the context of combined global social 
and reputational knowledge64, where cooperators form a separate community that achieves a higher cooperation 
level than the community of defectors. These observations point to the behavioural relevance of comparison and 
reputational homophily in sustaining possible cooperation.
In common with other models, in addition to specifying heuristic conditions for donation, social comparison 
strategies must define assessment rules that provide criteria for updating reputation in response to donation. 
Applying standing or judging with social comparison heuristics has a significant positive effect on evolutionary 
stability, enabling small numbers of individuals to discriminate against defectors and dominate through succes-
sive reproduction. While the assessment rules of standing and judging have previously been observed as effective 
in reinforcing the evolution of indirect reciprocity, such as by providing additional discrimination over image 
scoring2,3, we observe that both standing and judging operate by penalising actions that are inconsistent with the 
dominant social comparison heuristic of donation to those whose reputation is similar or upward in compari-
son. This has not been previously observed, and is a possible contributory factor in making the discrimination 
of standing and judging effective, by ensuring that conditions are supported that don’t impede natural selection.
We also observe that the dominant social comparison heuristic is a pre-requisite for the evolution of indirect 
reciprocity identified in significant previous contributions. Nowak and colleagues1 showed that evolution based 
on image scoring could favour indirect reciprocity. The evolution of a pair of absolute reputation-based thresholds 
h, k were observed, where i donates to j if j has an image of at least k and/or i’s own image is less than h. Notably 
the dominant social comparison heuristic is immediately evident: threshold k supports donation by i when sim-
ilar and upward comparison with the reputation of j is observed. Additionally the dominant social comparison 
heuristic is also implicitly present in the results: Fig. 4(a,b)1 show that strategies cannot significantly evolve when 
h < k, which is precisely the when overlap between the donor and recipient images is not possible. When this 
is relaxed, it then becomes possible for similar and upward comparison between the donor’s target image (i.e., 
Figure 6. Average cooperation level and percentage of the (1, 1, 0) heuristic from all games in all 
generations, applying a heterogeneous population with g groups, for g = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. c/b ratio for image 
scoring is 0.1. c/b ratio for standing is 0.85. Perception and execution errors are applied, both with a rate of 
2.5%. Other parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1. “Average cooperation” indicates the frequency of 
cooperative interaction: the number of donations made as a proportion of the total number of games played.
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threshold h) and the minimum threshold on donating to the recipient (i.e., k), representing the region where 
significant evolution is observed (Fig. 4(a,b)1).
These observations indicate that the dominant social comparison heuristic may play a more general role in 
supporting the evolution of indirect reciprocity. The most comprehensive understanding of the evolution of indi-
rect reciprocity has been obtained when reputation is assumed to be binary. Binary reputation assumes simplified 
cognition, where members of a population view others as having either a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ standing, as originally 
modelled from an economic perspective9. Through this simplification, it has been possible to consider all options 
for assessment of reputation and donor action52. Exactly eight possibilities for evolutionary stable assessment have 
been identified4: thus under assumptions of a binary reputation, these results precisely capture the conditions 
where indirect reciprocation can be robustly sustained (Table 1).
Table 1 shows that when the donor i and the recipient j are both in bad standing (i.e., i = 0, j = 0), assess-
ment rules and donation decisions are irrelevant, leaving three combinations of donor-recipient reputation (i.e., 
i ≠ 0 ∨ j ≠ 0). The view of the recipient’s reputation, from the donors perspective, can be interpreted in terms of 
social comparison (far right column, Table 1), and when doing so, we observe that the associated stable actions 
for donor i exactly correspond to the dominant social comparison heuristic: agent j donates when and only when 
recipient i has a similar or higher reputation. Thus, under binary reputation, the dominant social comparison 
heuristic exactly models the optimal actions.
In summary, simple self-referential cognitive approaches to decision making and the evolution of indirect 
reciprocity appear to be strongly linked. From a behavioural perspective, the origins of social comparison are 
potentially distant40, and belie survival related decision-making. Social comparison features as a way in which 
individuals comprehend and reason about their place within society65. Significant evidence indicates that while 
humans may lack the capacity to rationally evaluate the huge number of decisions that they face27, heuristics 
characterise the intuitive thinking that compensates66. Recent work22 has shown that intuitive decision making in 
cooperative one-shot dilemmas may generally be guided by social heuristics that reinforce previously successful 
behaviour, with slower reflexive processes moderating fitness of the heuristic to the wider context. Given that 
relative positioning within social context affects donation behaviour35–37, actions based on social comparison are 
immediate candidates for social heuristics.
Social comparison heuristics also provide an interesting perspective on conditions supporting the evolution 
of indirect reciprocity. Beyond recent contributions22,26, behavioural consideration of prosociality has largely 
occurred in isolation from the characterisation of such conditions. However through associated heuristics, social 
comparison naturally lends itself to evolutionary analysis, and the social comparison heuristic of donating to 
those with similar or a higher reputation dominates, which is consistent with social comparison being a form of 
evaluation for aspirational human behaviour67. Leading observations on the evolution of indirect reciprocity1,4,9 
have connection to the dominant social comparison heuristic, to the extent that under binary representation this 
heuristic exactly characterises the actions of the evolutionary stable solutions. Furthermore, discriminatory social 
norms for crediting individuals with reputation, in particular standing and judging, represent penalisation for 
actions that are inconsistent with the dominant social comparison heuristic.
Given that social comparison heuristics provide insight into the explanation for conditions supporting indirect 
reciprocity, an extraordinary feature of humans in contrast to other species, we note that any social comparison 
involved could have also influenced the evolution of the social brain. As implied by the social brain hypothe-
sis41,68,69, living in functional social groups imposes cognitive demands that are consistent with the evolution of 
species having a larger relative brain size70. These cognitive demands stem from the information processing asso-
ciated with the social complexity of larger groups71. It has been conjectured18 that indirect reciprocity may have 
provided the selective challenge driving the cerebral expansion in human evolution, albeit without reference to a 
candidate mechanism. As social comparison is evident in the evolution of indirect reciprocity, that it is prevalent 
in observed human behaviour and that human survival through sociality is enhanced by indirect reciprocity, we 
conjecture that social comparison has provided sufficient difficulty to promote such cerebral expansion, consist-
ent with the social complexity hypothesis72.
We also note that these findings also have wider relevance for contemporary autonomous systems73. Beyond 
human intelligence, the aspirational homophily heuristic has implications for the evolution of distributed com-
putational and communication systems that involve one-shot interactions. Recent examples include device to 
device communication for opportunistic networks74,75, which can be supported by exploiting cooperative proto-
cols between devices or their users76,77. We note that subject to an accurate means of third party perception, social 
comparison lends itself to machine execution, opening up prospects for autonomous entities to pursue optimal 
behaviour based on a simple heuristic of relative self comparison, which supports both individual and social util-
ity with limited requirements for centralised control.
assumed initial 
reputations
stable assessments - updated 
reputation for i in response to: stable actions 
for donor i
donor i’s comparative view 
of recipient j’s reputationi j defection against j donation to j
1 1 0 1 donate similar
1 0 1 any defect lower
0 1 0 1 donate higher
0 0 any any donate or defect similar
Table 1.  The leading eight stable strategies and social comparison.
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Methods
We apply an evolutionary framework based on the donation game, a special case of the mutual aid game59 assum-
ing a single donor. Parameter settings represent typical conditions through which the effects of social compar-
ison are observable. Unless otherwise stated, results represent an average of 5 randomly seeded observations. 
Information on accessing data supporting the results is available78.
Evolution. Unless otherwise stated in the experiment, we apply a single homogeneous population of N-players 
over M-generations, with m games per generation, and we use default parameters of N = 100, M = 100,000 and 
m = 5,000, resulting in each player participating in an average of 50 games per generation. A heterogeneous pop-
ulation is adopted using the modified Island Model17, where the global population of 100 is divided into g social 
groups of equal size (when g = 3 the groups are of size 33 and 34). In each game a donor i and potential recipient 
j are selected at random. When the population is heterogeneous, j is always randomly selected from the same 
group as i.
Action rules. Evolution acts upon individual social comparison heuristics, which for a donor i is denoted by a 
binary triple (si, ui, di) indicating whether or not i donates when similarity (si), upward comparison (ui) or down-
ward comparison (di) is observed by i in respect of the potential recipient j’s reputation (rj), as compared to i’s rep-
utation (ri). These represent the action rules, where approximate similarity is identified when rj − Δ ≤ ri ≤ rj + Δ , 
upward self-comparison occurs when rj > ri + Δ , and downward self-comparison occurs when rj < ri − Δ . We apply 
a default setting of Δ = 0 for the standing and judging assessments and Δ = 1  for image scoring.  Unless otherwise 
stated in the experiment, the initial population is formed from randomly selected social comparison heuristics.
Assessment. When players are assumed to have a non-binary reputation, this is incremented/decremented 
by integer units in the range ± 5 as in refs 1,17, dependent on the assessment rule. Three assessment rules feature in 
this study: image scoring, standing and judging. In image scoring, a potential donor i’s reputation is incremented 
if a donation is made to j, and decremented otherwise. Standing is interpreted as decrementing the reputation of i 
when i defects in light of a request from a player j that is at least as reputable as i. Additionally judging represents 
decrementing the reputation of ri when i makes a donation to a recipient j of lower reputation. Reputation is set 
to zero at the beginning of each generation, and assumed to be public, visible to all members of the population.
Selection and reproduction. The act of donation from i to j results in an economic transaction, with cost c 
to player i and benefit b to player j. The payoff to player i over a generation is their total benefit arising from dona-
tions received less the total cost of the donations they made. At the start of each generation, individual payoff is set 
to zero and used as the fitness function. Social comparison heuristics are propagated to the next generation based 
on uniform random selection of heuristics from some group of players S, weighted by the fitness of the members 
of S. This clonal reproduction is dependent on a single parent and commonly used in previous studies on indi-
rect reciprocity based on evolutionary simulation1,17,57,58. When the population is assumed to be heterogeneous, 
S is the parent’s social group with probability p, and S is the global population with probability 1 − p. When the 
population is assumed to be homogeneous, S represents the global population. When creating a new generation, 
mutation allows a random change of heuristic to take place with probability μ = 1/100.
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